When the CIA Worried About Ukrainian Nationalism

When the CIA Worried About Ukrainian Nationalism

At the beginning of the Cold War, they operated Ukraine at least three major nationalist groups active against the Soviet Union. Groups that caught Langley’s attention were interested in possible special operations on the territory of the Socialist Republic of Ukraine.

InsideOver already told you in the article dedicated to Lugansk that Ukraine was home to dreams of independence. And if winds of autonomy had been blowing in the east of the country (in those provinces that are now disputed in Kyiv by Vladimir Putin) since 1919, the prospect of a nation freed from the yoke of the great powers had also been blowing in the central and western areas since widespread at the beginning of the 20th century.

The Russian persecutions in the 1930s and later the German occupation in the Second World War they provided a kind of lifeblood for the independent realities of which Stepan Bandera is perhaps the most recognizable name and face in Ukraine and the West. Here he became “famous” after the Russian invasion of February 24, 2022. In fact, Bandera was a leading element in the struggle for Ukrainian identity before, during and after World War II. Attention, we write identity and not freedom, because as a “partisan” Bandera is sui generis. nationalist, anti-communist; As an ally, prisoner and renewed collaborator with the Germans, Bandera attempted to exploit the Nazi occupation of Ukrainian territories to create an independent Ukrainian state.

The historical figure that we would today call “ambiguous”, despite his behavior, reflects the character of the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Balkans: the defense of the ethnic group to which he belongs is superior to any ideology, any political conviction and any international balance . This element is exploited by the great powers, in the case of Bandera dal Third Reich to the detriment of the Soviets and their allies, the Jews and Poles. And which, in the new Cold War scenario, was also followed with interest by Washington. In 1957, therefore, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) classified as “secret” an extensive focus on Ukraine, a detailed and in-depth analysis of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic on history, geography and economic factors, and anti-Soviet activities. The objective is in the title of the report: Resistance Factors and Special Forces Area. Through the reconstruction of partisan activities in World War II, the CIA identified four areas where the resistance was stronger: Poland (now Belarus), South Volhynia, the Carpathian region and the Crimean Mountains. The geographical origin also influences the political orientation of the groups: pro-Soviet groups (Ukrainians loyal to Moscow and Red Army soldiers cut off from retreat) are concentrated in eastern Ukraine, nationalist groups in western Ukraine, such as in Volhynia in 1943, the Ukrainian nationalists persecuted the Poles harshly to prevent them that by the end of the conflict Poland could claim territories with a Polish majority but actually perceived by Ukrainians as their own. An example is the city of Lviv, now Ukraine, but with a strong Polish tradition. The perspectives are also different: the pro-Russians support Moscow and the Red Army, while the nationalists aim to create a unit independent of Germans and Soviets with Ukrainian culture and language.

The documents also underline that some densely forested areas would lend themselves well to unconventional forms of warfare, as Russian forces would have difficulty penetrating them. Resistance factors and special forces range is both asoil analysis keep an eye on the skills of the local resistance groups which opposed the NKVD and MVD after the Red Army recaptured Ukraine between 1945 and 1954. The Ukrainian is not an isolated episode. In fact, for decades, anti-Soviet partisans have operated in the areas recaptured or occupied by the Red Army and its allies. In the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia there were the Kraziri (Crusaders, Nda) who collected the legacy of Ustasha Croatian nationalism; in the south, in Kosovo, Kosovar independence will give Belgrade a hard time until the death of Josip Broz and even beyond.

On the shores of the Baltic Sea, however, Estonians, Lithuanians and Latvians fought against both the Nazis and the Soviets, or in other cases first fought alongside the Germans against the Soviets and then continued to fight after the end of the war.

Probably none of them staunch Nazi: The hope of an independent fatherland, of an identity that was not destroyed by the new Russian rulers, revived the alliance with Berlin before and after the war, the guerrilla war in the woods against the NKVD detachments of Beria.

It is no coincidence, then, that the United States closely followed these realities during the first decade of the Cold War. “The Baltic units of the Armed SS must be viewed by members of the German SS as separate and distinct in purpose, ideology, activities, and qualifications, so the commission is of the opinion that they are not a movement hostile to the US government,” concluded members of a commission commissioned with the Evaluation of the war crimes of the Waffen-SS.

It was 1950 and the wounds, especially those of the victims of Nazi persecution, are still fresh. However, the main Allied nation concluded that the Baltic SS was a separate reality from the others, with the likely aim of being able to exploit the veterans’ actions to contain Soviet power on the shores of the Baltic Sea. If we think about it, it’s similar to what happened recently with some units deployed in Ukraine against the Russians: despite strong suspicions of Nazi sympathies, they were backed and armed by the US and its Western allies to face the army of To fly. Even in Bandera’s case, Langley’s analysts gloss over unclear aspects of his past by focusing on the capabilities of three main anti-Soviet organizations: Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), Supreme Liberation Council of Ukraine (UHVR). ). ), all three “closely linked to leadership that takes the form of ‘interlocking board of directors’ with the same elements that are at the top of any organization”.

What is less clear, however, is the fact that the CIA recognizes that Oun, Upa, and Uhvr were indeed put down by the Soviet secret police since 1954. So why such a detailed report when potential allies are out there? The answer lies in the recent history of US foreign policy. The US, in fact, supported both very combative units (Contras, Viet Minh in an anti-Japanese key, Mujahideen) and realities that would never have had the opportunity to defeat the opposing forces on the field, like the Vietnamese Montagnard, the Alliance of the north between 1992 and 2001 and the Kurds. The interest in this case is not to win the confrontation with the enemy in the short term, but to wear him down and wear him down and force him to use ever greater resources and means to suppress the anti-government forces. What remained of Oun, Upa and Uhvr could have been reorganized by field workers to resume anti-Russian guerrilla activity after the 1954 setback. A ten-year, million-dollar strategy basically similar to the one we are witnessing today in Ukraine, a conflict destined to be protracted and evolving into a low-intensity clash between Kyiv and Russia. And the purpose of sending weapons and means is precisely to keep Moscow occupied as much as possible, with the hope that the miracle of Afghanistan will happen again: the USSR’s departure in 1989 and the collapse of the Union in 1991. , lowered the Red Flag on the Kremlin, both Russia and Afghanistan have gone through a period of very long instability, which in the case of Afghanistan continues to this day …