1:07 p.m., April 22, 2022
In 2008 Russia launched major reforms of its armed forces. In addition to the modernization of equipment and weapons, the focus was on optimizing the workforce and professionalizing the contingents. The effective was set at one million men. In fact, the professional military, both soldiers and officers, whose total number is more than 700,000 people, are still supported by about 260,000 conscripts. Around 130,000 men between the ages of 18 and 27 are called up for each of the two annual conscriptions. The duration of compulsory military service is currently twelve months.
In connection with the war that Vladimir Putin’s regime launched against Ukraine on February 24, it is important to return to the composition of the Russian army, especially from an ethnic and social point of view, since these aspects often escape the attention of observers. Nonetheless, they reveal the structure of contemporary Russian society.
A world-renowned institution
Along with the presidency and the various security services, the army has traditionally been one of the most respected social institutions in Russia. Today, a majority of Russians trust their armed forces and believe they can largely protect the country in the event of a military conflict. This opinion was shared by 60% of respondents in January 2014, before the start of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and Russia’s military engagement in Syria; the rate would have risen to 89% today.
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In May 2021, 61% of Russians agreed that “every real man” should do his military service, according to figures from the Levada Center, an independent polling firm. 24% (42% of 18 to 24 year olds) see it as a “task to the state”, even if this may contradict individual projects. Only 12% of respondents said that military service was “pointless and dangerous” and therefore “should be avoided at all costs”. However, these numbers are just a facade that hides complex societal realities.
A historically multinational army
The official formula that Russia should have constituted itself as a “multi-ethnic and multi-confessional state” also applies to military affairs.
Culturally non-Russian regiments existed within the imperial armies and were part of the tsar’s personal guard throughout the 19th century. During World War I, the indigenous cavalry division known as the “Wild Division” consisted almost entirely of volunteers from the Muslim peoples of the Russian Empire.
Like the Soviet Union, the Red Army was multinational. The Second World War also affected all populations of the USSR. Since the armed forces were based on conscription, the Soviet authorities took the “ethnic factor” very seriously, be it the distribution of conscripts by camp region, divisional limitations on the number of soldiers representing nationalities considered “aggressive” (particularly Caucasians) or even the use of soldiers as military translators (like the Tajiks during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan).
As early as 1979, the Soviet regime even ordered two special units, so-called “Muslim battalions”, in Afghanistan. Although these practices are apparently less common in contemporary Russia, the multi-ethnic component is still characteristic of its armed forces.
Over-representation of minorities in the Russian army
The current war in Ukraine makes it possible to estimate its extent, although full official data are not available.
For example, a week after the launch of what Moscow calls a “military special operation,” journalists from the Russian affiliate of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty analyzed the content of several Telegram channels that published information about dead or captured Russian soldiers in Ukraine. The results of the analysis showed that about 30% of the surnames were similar to those borne by people from “non-Russian” minorities, a large majority of whom are of Muslim culture. There would therefore be an over-representation of minorities among the soldiers, who make up almost 20% of the total population of Russia.
A similar observation is made by independent researcher Kamil Galeev, who had access to a list of wounded soldiers admitted to a hospital in Russia’s Rostov-on-Don region, which borders Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk regions). However, these data remain incomplete and do not allow us to say with certainty, like Galeev, that the Russian army is becoming that of the “minorities”. The Russian army casualties (1,083 people) confirmed by official sources on April 5, 2022 show that the soldiers and officials who died in Ukraine came from all regions of Russia.
On the other hand, sending soldiers of “non-Slavic” origin to the war in Ukraine could be a strategic decision by the Russian authorities, given the family ties that exist between many ethnic Russians and Ukrainians. We also know that the Russian state sets annual quotas to avoid overflowing conscripts from the North Caucasus regions for fear of an increase in ethnic unrest within the regiments. The Russian term zemliatchestvo describes these mutual aid communities that form between conscripts from the same region of origin, creating informal hierarchies that coexist with military discipline.
However, no one can ignore the significant presence, even the over-representation, of people of “non-Russian” ethnic or cultural origin in the regular armed forces, not to mention the Chechen battalions stationed in Syria (essentially military police) and then in Ukraine. (essentially from the National Guard) who show boundless devotion to their leader, Ramzan Kadyrov.
Several factors explain this situation and show the current state of the army and Russian society as a whole.
Demographics, social mobility and economic stagnation
The first factor is demographics. In 2018-2020, a natural increase was observed only in 17 regions of Russia out of a total of 85 (including Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, which were illegally annexed in 2014). Among these 17 regions where the birth rate is higher than the death rate, the autonomous regions formed on a “non-Russian” ethnic basis are in the majority. This trend is long-lasting and has been confirmed over a longer period of time, especially since the 1990s and 2000s.
In addition to the Muslim republics of the North Caucasus (Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Chechnya), there are three Siberian republics: Yakutia (Sakha), Buryatia and Tuva. It is therefore not surprising that these areas have a high number of conscripts in relation to their inhabitants.
A second factor that sheds light on the strong presence of ethnic minorities in the Russian army lies in the fact that military service is a privileged means of social mobility for these “non-Slavic” young men, who may be in the most populated areas being stigmatized by ethnic Russians. A similar trend can be observed in other countries, such as the United States, where blacks are over-represented in the armed forces. In addition, the possibility of a stable career attracts a certain number of foreign citizens aged 18-30 who speak Russian (particularly nationals of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia): since 2010 they have had the opportunity to join the Russian Armed Forces , by signing an Five-year contract, which can be extended in the event of obtaining Russian citizenship.
An army of the poor?
There is also a third factor that should not be underestimated: the autonomous areas mentioned are peripheral and economically disadvantaged regions, like many “ethnic Russian” regions. These areas are often characterized by high unemployment rates and low income levels, especially when compared to the country’s major metropolitan areas. These economic and social inequalities result in different attitudes towards conscription.
In fact, despite the above statistics, many young people from relatively affluent backgrounds have a rather negative image of military service and the army in general. Many young people in big cities are used to the comforts of urban life and consumer society and do not feel ready to sacrifice their lives for the fatherland. They therefore resort to maneuvers to evade conscription: pursue university studies in order to obtain a temporary exemption; pay a doctor to get a fake exemption certificate and get fired; or, in the worst case, to beg for community service in the form of community service (e.g. in a hospital).
The average salary of a professional soldier – 32,000 rubles (about 380 euros) according to the Russian Defense Ministry, below the official average salary of more than 50,000 rubles (600 euros) – is not likely to attract many people from the educated middle class, even if the income in practice through ever increasingly important social guarantees (housing, military pensions, loans at preferential interest rates, access to cultural and sports facilities).
On the other hand, military service is more attractive to people from less privileged backgrounds. While some simply do not have the financial means to avoid conscription, others see joining the army as a stable and remunerated career opportunity, especially since the social status of the military has improved significantly since the 2000s, which is particularly due to the increase defense spending (the official figures are likely to be underestimated), better discipline leading to a reduction in harassment practices (dedovchtchina), as well as the reduction in length of military service (which has fallen from 24 to 12 months since 2008).
Masculinity stereotypes aside, which describe the army as a “life school for real men”, these changes mean that many young men from Russia’s periphery, from small towns and from the countryside, are keen to join the ranks of the army soldiers. Unexpected situations may arise, for example when young nationals of the North Caucasus are willing to pay (sic) to be drafted into the army and then consider a future in the professional army.
If today it is difficult to measure the impact of these ethnic and social factors on the conduct of the war and the consequences of the war in Ukraine, they must be taken into account in order to better understand the current state of Russian society. Also, the strong minority presence is not unrelated to the growing role of Islam in Russia, and the social make-up of the Russian army corresponds to the situation of the Russian working class, who are beset by feelings of powerlessness and helplessness today, and no doubt others tomorrow impoverishment.
This article was republished by The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.