The building that housed a Palestinian Islamic Jihad military leader, Khaled Mansour, was destroyed by an Israeli attack in Rafah on August 8, 2022. HATEM MOUSSA v AP
On Friday, August 5, in the middle of the afternoon, the Israeli army attacked the Gaza Strip, specifically targeting a building in a residential area in the city center. These attacks, followed by more volleys a few hours later, then by shelling during the night, killed Tayssir Al-Jabari, commander of the Al-Quds Brigades, the armed wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the movement aligned with Hamas controls the Palestinian enclave.
Finally, shortly after 11:30 p.m. Sunday, August 7, Israel and Islamic Jihad, mediated by Egypt, silenced their guns. A precarious ceasefire, for which the Islamist movement says it has “received Egypt’s commitment to work for the release of two prisoners”: Khalil Awawdeh, who is being held without charge and is in poor health after nearly 150 days on a hunger strike, and Bassam Al-Saadi, head of Islamic Jihad in the occupied West Bank.
Political scientist Leïla Seurat, a researcher at the Arab Center for Research and Political Studies (CAREP) and associated with the Center for Sociological Research on Law and Penal Institutions (CESDIP), discusses the origins of this movement and the relationships it has with Hamas’ competitor and ally of convenience.
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For what purpose was Palestinian Islamic Jihad established?
Islamic Jihad was founded in the late 1970s by Fathi Shiqaqi, a Palestinian who was initially close to the Muslim Brotherhood organization but gradually distanced himself from it, denouncing his lack of commitment to the national liberation struggle. He also criticizes the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for its secular approach. The JIP, conceived from the outset as a third way, was founded against these two movements.
At its base, Islamic Jihad is made up of former members of the Muslim Brotherhood and a formation affiliated with Fatah [le parti du président de l’Autorité palestinienne, Mahmoud Abbas]. He advocates the establishment of a Palestinian Islam that is both patriotic and revolutionary. More broadly, their political proposition is part of a regional context of discrediting Ba’athism and pan-Arabism. [qui visent à unifier les peuples arabes]exacerbated by the Syrian intervention against the PLO in Lebanon in 1976. It is also necessary to consider the emergence of the Islamic revolution in Iran during this period, which feeds Fathi Shiqaqi’s anti-colonial theses and encourages him in the idea of building another Opportunity to liberate the territories conquered by Israel.
The ideological hybridity of the movement, which is both Sunni and heavily inspired by Shi’ism, means that it distances itself from both Fatah and Hamas, shows its neutrality and works as far as possible to unite the Palestinian ranks.
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What is the relationship between Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas?
As early as 2006, Islamic Jihad accused Hamas of taking part in the Palestinian parliamentary elections and entering the institutions of the Palestinian Authority. Unlike Hamas, Islamic Jihad has no intention of exercising political power. In 2007, Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip led it to seek to consolidate its truce with Israel. This situation imposes increased scrutiny on the other factions, led by Islamic Jihad, who wish to confront Israel militarily.
Depending on the context, Hamas has more or less imposed this control, often allowing Islamic Jihad to operate or even allying with it. This was the case in August 2011 when the Al-Quds Forces fired several rockets at cities in southern Israel [la branche armée du JIP] and by Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades. In a joint communiqué, the two military organizations had announced the bombing of the settlement of Ofakim in response to the assassination of a leader of the popular resistance committees.
However, Islamic Jihad can be a problem for Hamas simply because it threatens its reputation. This competition was particularly observed during the Israeli aggression in November 2012. Islamic Jihad launched its first missile with a range of 70 kilometers towards Tel Aviv, followed immediately by another shot by Hamas’ al-Qassam Brigades.
But this competition could not escape the coordination between the two movements, which mostly show their solidarity by signing armistices that reaffirm the victory of all factions of the resistance. Since 2018, all armed factions have also been represented in a joint military action chamber.
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What about the relations between the PIJ and the Palestinian Authority?
Islamic Jihad does not recognize Palestinian Authority institutions that have entered into security coordination with Israel. On the other hand, like Hamas, it is trying to integrate the PLO and reactivate this structure around new bases.
What strategy is Israel pursuing towards these two movements?
Israel has long held Hamas responsible for rockets fired from the Gaza Strip by other factions, which regularly target al-Qassam Brigades fighters for actions by others, including Islamic Jihad.
Israel regularly exploits the ties between these two movements by assassinating Islamic Jihad leaders (2011 and 2019) to test the Hamas response. The latter, although bound by the ceasefire, is mostly forced to let Islamic Jihad respond to the assassination of its leaders.
Recent Israeli aggression appears to show a remarkable development: Israel does not appear to blame Hamas for the 500 rockets fired during the three days of confrontation. Israel has never targeted Hamas. This relative tolerance appears to be part of a renewal of the strategy to split the resistance’s ranks after the battle dubbed “the sword of Jerusalem.” In 2021, the emergence of a united front by all Palestinian factions during this battle was experienced by Israel as a real trauma.
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By officially designating Islamic Jihad as the main enemy and by asking Hamas to choose between Islamic Jihad “terrorists” and the civilian population in Gaza, Israel is seeking to undermine the common front that has emerged in this struggle. It’s too early to know how effective this fork strategy will prove.
And the fact remains that this latest Israeli aggression has once again landed Hamas in trouble, which sees its legitimacy as a resistance movement somewhat tarnished by being bound by a ceasefire.
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Is Palestinian Islamic Jihad supported by the people of Gaza?
The movement enjoys great popularity among the Palestinian population, not only in Gaza (since the PIJ is not in power it has not suffered a tarnished image like Hamas) but also in the West Bank.
Does Palestinian Islamic Jihad have allies in the region?
Islamic Jihad receives significant economic and military aid from Iran. Unlike Hamas, it did not close its offices in Damascus after the 2011 Syrian uprising. Nor has she criticized Hezbollah for its involvement in the fighting in Syria. However, Islamic Jihad cannot be considered as Iran’s “surrogate”. In recent years he has shown his independence from Tehran on several issues. Such is the case, for example, with the war in Yemen: while the Iranians had been urging Islamic Jihad to align themselves with their position, its leaders refused to do so – which would have cost them a downfall. Islamic Jihad insists at all costs on demonstrating its autonomy and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
Though ideologically close to Iran, Islamic Jihad insists on the Sunni character of its organization. While some sources mention their members’ conversions to Shi’ism, their leaders regularly provide clarification: a Shi’a cannot officially be part of the organization, which remains Sunni obedience, even if bridges are possible.
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