by Luca Angelini
Former world chess champion Garry Kasparov and former Yukos oligarch and former political prisoner Mikhail Khodorkovsky argue that the world need not fear a Russia without a “tsar” at its helm
Former world chess champion Garry Kasparov and former Yukos oligarch and former political prisoner Mikhail Khodorkovsky (here is his interview with Federico Fubini), co-founder of the Russian Action Committee, are Vladimir Putin’s most internationally renowned opponents alongside Alexei Navalny. It will come as no surprise, then, that in an article on foreign affairs they argue that the world should not fear a Russia without Putin at the helm. But while they’re definitely not super partes, their point of view deserves consideration (and, perhaps not coincidentally, was the most read article on the magazine’s website for several days).
Kasparov and Khodorkovsky are well aware that fear of a power vacuum in the Kremlin and the possible chaos it could entail (we talked about this in the November 23 and January 12 reviews) is one of the reasons Washington is holding back not only the delivery of arms to Kyiv, which could lead to the defeat of Russia (but also to an escalation with potentially disastrous consequences). “Many in the Biden administration believe that Putin’s ouster could trigger the collapse of Russia, throwing a nuclear-armed state into chaos and potentially empowering China. But such fears are overrated. The risk of a collapse of Russia is, of course, real. But it’s bigger with Putin in office – pushing the country in an increasingly centralized and militarized direction – than it would be under a democratic and federal regime. The longer the current regime stays in power, the greater the risk of an unpredictable rupture.”
In short, they believe that “the end of Putin’s tyrannical government will really transform Russia (and the rest of the world) radically, but not in the way the White House thinks it will. Rather than destabilizing Russia and its neighbors, a Ukrainian victory would eliminate a powerful revanchist force and strengthen the cause of democracy around the world. According to her, the notion that Russia is not a country where democracy can take root is simply the result of Putin’s anti-Western propaganda: “For nearly two decades, some Western experts have argued that the Russian people will never accept democracy and that Russia condemned to revenge. In fact, Putin’s propaganda has succeeded in instilling in a significant segment of Russian society the idea that Western values are alien to Russia. But economic integration with the West has enabled other countries to overcome a fascist legacy. And deeper integration with Europe, coupled with conditional relaxation of Western sanctions, could help Russia do the same. After Putin’s military defeat, Russia would have to choose: either become a vassal of China or begin reintegration into Europe (having first rightly compensated Ukraine for the damage inflicted during the war and punished war crimes). For most Russians, the choice in favor of peace, freedom and prosperity would be obvious, even more so in the case of a speedy reconstruction of Ukraine.”
In their speech, Kasparov and Khodorkovsky also broadly summarize the roadmap they have been developing with the Russian Action Committee for post-Putin Russia’s transition to full democracy. Reading it, one gets the impression that it is an ambitious project, maybe too much. Which assumes that with Putin’s ouster, power will pass to the liberal-democratic forces and not to even more nationalist and reactionary sectors of Russian politics.
In any case, Putin’s two sworn enemies see the Russian “transition” like this:
Within two years of the dissolution of the Putin regime, Russians will elect a constituent assembly to adopt a new constitution and establish a new system of regional bodies. But in the short term, before the Assembly can take office, an interim Council of State with legislative powers to oversee a provisional technocratic government would be needed. Its core would consist of rule-of-law Russians, those who have publicly denied Putin’s war and illegitimate regime. Most were forced into exile, where we were free to organize in absentia and build a virtual civil society. Such preparations will enable us to act quickly and work with the Western powers, whose cooperation the new Russian government will need to stabilize the economy. Immediately after taking power, the State Council will strike a peace deal with Ukraine that will recognize the country’s 1991 borders and compensate it for the damage caused by Putin’s war. The State Council will also formally repudiate the imperial policies of the Putin regime in Russia and abroad, including by ceasing all formal and informal support for pro-Russian entities in former Soviet Union countries. And it would end Russia’s longstanding confrontation with the West and instead shift to a foreign policy based on peace, partnership and integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Domestically, the State Council would begin to demilitarize Russia, reducing the size of the armed forces and, consequently, the cost of maintaining them. It would also disband Putin’s police-state organs, including the Repressive Federal Security Service and the Counter-Extremism Center, and repeal all repressive laws enacted during Putin’s rule. All political prisoners would be released and fully rehabilitated, and a major amnesty program would be implemented to reduce the overall number of prisoners in Russia. The State Council would also initiate the process of decentralizing the country, delegating wide-ranging powers to the regions, including in budgetary matters.
Extensive program as you can see. It is justified to have more than one doubt about the possibility of practical implementation.
The first objection that can be raised is that the following Kasparov and Khodorkovsky have abroad is probably much larger than the one they have at home (partly because it’s easy to imagine them being controlled by the Kremlin). media are displayed). And in addition to overestimating support for their own beliefs, they appear to grossly underestimate Putin’s. The second is that history is by no means without examples of toppled regimes followed by chaos (one of the many examples is post-Saddam Hussein Iraq). To make matters worse, Russia is overflowing with nuclear weapons. As Arkady Ostrovsky wrote in The Economist: “Putin’s war is turning Russia into a failed state with uncontrolled borders, private military forces, fleeing populations, moral decay and the possibility of civil conflict. As Western politicians’ confidence in Ukraine’s ability to withstand Putin’s terror has increased, concerns about Russia’s ability to survive the war are growing. It could become unmanageable and thrown into chaos.”
Certainly everything must continue to be done to prevent Ukraine from being defeated by the brutal Russian invasion. However, how wise might it be at the end of the Putin regime not to set it as an indispensable (albeit understandably desirable) goal in the West, leaving it up to the Russians to decide the timing and methods, if any. Externally “enforced” regime changes that are politically questionable are almost always those with the greatest unknowns.
This article was first published in Corriere Press Review, a newsletter reserved for subscribers. To receive Il Punto – which includes the press review – for 30 days free of charge, you can register here
January 28, 2023 (change January 28, 2023 | 08:56)
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