The challenge between China and United States for Taiwan it inevitably goes through i chip, a true Pacific Island treasure. But if Taipei is the hottest front of this semiconductor challenge separating Washington and Beijing, the issue goes beyond “simple” control of the island to extend into American territory as well.
Confirming the importance of this conflict and the value placed on semiconductors in the imperial logic of the People’s Republic of China and the United States is the bipartisan bill Chips and Science Act 2022: a $52 billion measure aimed at boosting semiconductor research and development in the United States. President Joe Biden explained the importance of this proposal by declaring that chips are “the foundation of the modern economy” and recalling that “the United States once had 40% of world production, but then as our production declined, production declined was transferred abroad”.
The goal of democratic administration is twofold. On the one hand there is the rather temporary and contingent move of production indoors for clear elective reasons: to fully activate the factories on the national territory election campaign for midterm elections and with a Biden in crisis in the face of the Republican wave, it is a signal of a will to regain ground in public opinion. It is no coincidence that on the day the law was passed, US company Micron announced an investment of $40 billion which, according to the US giant, will result in 40,000 new jobs. Lifeblood for a presidency that appeared very fragile and was doomed to suffer a severe setback.
But apart from the electoral question, albeit fundamental, there is the most important question, namely that of the clash with China. The confirmation of this international importance of the Chips and Science Act signed by Biden comes from two reactions of a diplomatic nature. The first, internal, is represented by the note issued by the US Secretary of State, Anton Blinken. The head of US diplomacy defined the bipartisan provision as “a fundamental step forward in preparing our economy for the challenges of the 21st century.” While harsh words of condemnation came from the opposite front, the Chinese. As reported by Agi, spokesman for China’s foreign ministry, Wang Wenbinattacked the American measure, denouncing “restrictions on normal investment and economic and commercial activities of relevant companies in China” and reiterating that these measures, defined in the Chips and Science Act, “have a strong geopolitical impact and are another example of economic coercion by the United States “.
The topic has also become important in recent days for strengthening the so-called alliance “chips 4”, a semiconductor cooperation platform between the United States, Japan and Taiwan, which South Korea appears to have joined. According to the South Korean press, the president said all ministries involved are evaluating the issue “through the lens of interest.” , although Industry Minister Lee Chang-yang currently denies Seoul’s participation because “it does not intend to join an exclusive group that marginalizes certain countries like China.” For South Korea, it’s a matter of balancing two opposing interests: that of its key military ally and that of its key economic partner. The Asian government does not want to be drawn into a system where challenging Beijing risks jeopardizing its economy. But it is clear that the semiconductor game is now becoming more central to Indo-Pacific logic. and Taiwan, real “Eldorado” of chips, was a very clear warning. As Linkiesta reports, Taiwan now produces “20% of the world’s semiconductors and over 90% of the most technological chips”: chips that are also used in the main electronic systems of the United States armed forces, but also by the main giants of the national industry. The ability to independently produce this technology and prevent China from controlling its production and trade is a key goal. And Washington is perfectly aware of this.