A few days ago, retired American General Ben Hodges tweeted about his country’s aid strategy for Ukraine. According to him, and by carefully avoiding to date supplying Kyiv with long-range weapons or aircraft capable of carrying them, the United States has provided Russia with a “sanctuary” from which to prepare and launch its attacks on its neighbor.
Why are we allowing Russia to shoot from the safe haven? By not providing UKR with ATACMS, F16 and other long-range attack capabilities, we have effectively given sanctuary to Russia, which is capable of killing innocent civilians in Ukraine without fear of repercussions. Unsustainable policy. https://t.co/HA6K9eE7AD
— Ben Hodges (@general_ben) December 30, 2022
That sanctuary is Crimea, a legally Ukrainian territory but occupied and then occupied by Russia since 2014, and one of the crossroads of this conflict. According to the Kiev authorities, as well as many of Kiev’s allies, the matter is understood.
For example, as Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, a beloved Moscow ally, asserted in a spectacular about-face, Crimea is indeed part of Ukraine, and Ukraine’s victory is inconceivable without its restoration.
According to Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, however, things are far from clear. “We are focused on continuing what we started, which means making sure Ukraine has what it needs to defend itself, what it needs to repel Russian aggression and the occupied since February 24 Reclaim territory,” he told the Wall Street Journal in early December.
So this is not about Crimea, which is left out of the ultimate goals of American military aid. However, as The New York Times explains, things are changing, slowly but surely.
Rear chainstay
So Washington is beginning to understand that if it is to put Ukraine in a position of strength in hypothetical future peace negotiations, it must support Ukraine in its attacks on the Russian-held peninsula.
Washington made a slow but impressive political shift from discreet and timid (but indispensable and vital) aid to a full supply of increasingly capable equipment, such as the famous Himars, in the first days of the invasion.
The United States is considering how best to cross one of the last Rubicons by now helping Kyiv attack targets in Crimea, which it has done so far alone, with sometimes spectacular results, such as the attack on the Kerch Bridge, a important logistical link connecting the peninsula directly with Russia.
For Crimea is not just a part of Ukrainian territory: in fact, as Ben Hodges explains, it has become one of the main rear bases for Russian operations throughout Ukraine, particularly in the south.
Carrying out effective, destructive and increasingly distant attacks would be a means of seriously disrupting Moscow’s military advance on its neighbor while Russia appears to be preparing for huge offensives, particularly with a new massive mobilization as well as general military reinforcements coming to a long one War.
Washington has long feared a Russian escalation, the New York Times explains, and has been particularly cautious about the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in the event of too concrete a threat to its jewels in Crimea. While these fears haven’t entirely disappeared from the equation, they appear to have diminished in intensity, opening the door to more direct help from Washington.
This happened notably with the recent announcement of the deployment of Bradley tanks – an equipment transfer with a clear offensive orientation that would have been unthinkable at the start of the conflict.
With French-supplied AMX-10 RCs, the German Marders, more recently Britain’s heaviest Challenger 2s, and anticipating perhaps massive delivery of German Leopard 2s by a European coalition, the Bradleys could serve as the spearhead of a Ukrainian counter-offensive south – or even at that serve to cut once and for all the Kerch Bridge, which is vital for Russian supplies to Crimea and from there to the rest of Ukraine.
A bridge too far
“Ukraine could use these Bradleys to transport troops on important routes like the M14, which connects Kherson, Melitopol and Mariupol,” Seth G. Jones, analyst for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told the NYT. “Ukrainian infantry advancing in that direction would come under heavy fire from the Russian positions, and the Bradleys would provide them with offensive power and protection.”
In addition, each advance towards the south allows Ukraine to deepen its attacks in Crimea on Russian bases or airports with the Himars made available to it in particular by the United States. So many attacks that would severely restrict Russia’s freedom of action in its “sanctuary” in Crimea.
“We have placed fundamental limits on Ukraine and stated that this war will be fought on Ukrainian soil and not on Russian soil,” said Philip Breedlove, a four-star general who served as the chief commander of the United States Armed Forces in Europe and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe during Russia’s conquest of Crimea in 2014.
“Offering Russia a haven from which to fight without fear of reprisals is absolutely absurd. It makes no sense militarily.”
As the New York Times explains, and although Ukrainian and American soldiers are specifically discussing the offensive and its adjustment to the resources provided, upper echelons in Washington do not really believe in Kiev’s ability to retake Crimea militarily. And always put the hola on the supplies of long-range missiles like the ATACMS, which however would greatly facilitate their action.
For Washington, it’s a matter of weakening Russia’s stance, putting Moscow back against the wall before the war finally deadlocks, and putting Ukraine in a position of strength when potential negotiations between the two countries begin.
Perhaps Vladimir Putin, who recently declared that peace in Donbass was the sole purpose of his “military special operation,” is already seeing the tide turning against the preservation of the peninsula.