After Washington changed its immigration policy toward Cubans, introducing the number of humanitarian parole and a new emigration policy aimed at stemming the flow across its land borders, the wave of questions has stayed the political nature that the migration option has always had in relations between the Cuban regime and the United States.
From the so-called Freedom Flights, the Camarioca Pier, the Mariel Exodus and the Rafters Crisis of 1994, Castroism always used migration as an outlet for its internal tensions and as leverage for his northern enemy.
But given the new situation, which Washington says is trying to guarantee “orderly and safe” migration, exactly what Havana is asking for in its statements on the matter, what will happen to the Cuban migrants to the US? Coupled with the resumption of consular services by the Washington Embassy in Cuba and the fulfillment of the migrant visa issuance quota in 2022 for the first time in half a decade, what are the political implications of this for the island’s regime?
DIARIO DE CUBA spoke to the Cuban political scientist Leduan Ramírez Pérezgraduated in 2019 with a research doctorate in social sciences from the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) with the thesis “Migrant Transnationalism in the Condition of Origin of States with an Authoritarian Regime: the Case of Cubans in Mexico”.
Given a migratory situation that is now equal to Cubans, Venezuelans, Haitians and Nicaraguans, at least in terms of eligibility, what about the much-discussed Cuban migratory privilege?
United States immigration policy is similar to these four groups of nationals in refusing to recognize the ability to seek asylum and refuge in the United States through traditional means. This means,
appear at the border and apply for asylum. This is traditional practice under United States law (Section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in the case of refugees and in the case of asylum under Section 208(a)(2).)(B ) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
However, it must be recognized that there is no such equality in the types, flows and processes of migration in either case. There is also no such equality with regard to the fundamental causes of migration in the individual groups. Eligibility in this sense is only conditional on security issues (after review) and an application sponsor. In this sense, Talking about privilege continues to be a mask for the treatment of Cuban migration.
The debate about the so-called privilege for Cuban migrants arises from the generalization of the treatment of this phenomenon. The main reasons for this error lie in the analysis of the migration conditions and their magnitude. Also because of the purification mechanism that constitutes the government of origin. And that should be noted Any process of forced migration is an act of group violence. In other words, governments manage migration, but at no point do they really care about addressing the causes that generate it.
In this case, The real origin of the Cuban migration is the terrible state and political leadership of the Cuban rulers. There are no privileges in migration. Nobody would have to leave their country for political, economic and social reasons. Focusing on Cubans as privileged means segmenting and promoting hatred among migrant groups. When you put a “privileged” group ahead of others in an academic discourse, you put that group at the center of a false debate that, in the long run, rather than rich in rights development, will do the opposite: it will constrain them.
With the steps taken by the US government, it is becoming clear that this supposed privilege was always conditional and not absolute. In this sense, it suffices to recall that in the past financial year there were more than 4,000 returns to the island under the 1996 agreements.
Havana has backed its criticism of the US on immigration, where the White House is using the issue to tarnish its reputation, emphasizing calls for “orderly and safe” migration. Now that Washington has done just that, what would be the regime’s arguments for questioning its historical enemy?
Havana has always contributed to the extension of responsibilities in all matters of public order and human rights. In other words, the root causes of the problems and difficulties always lie outside the island’s state administration.
but Havana’s argument collapses when we look at the diversification of tourist destinations over the past decade. Although the majority of Cuban migration continues to choose the United States as their final destination, it is important to mention that these have expanded, including Europe, with Spain and Italy being the main destinations, and Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Ecuador and Uruguay being the most important the American continent.
This is sufficient evidence to identify this It is not the United States government that is restricting relations with migrants, but the island’s government itself. Likewise, the Cuban government views its migrants as sources of economic resources and not as part of the nation. In this sense, maintaining and promoting an economic relationship is really important to the Cuban government, as it does not recognize any political involvement in national decisions.
It is also worth noting that these political decisions were not made by chance and that Havana was undoubtedly aware of these decisions for a long time. Just remember that in 2022 there were several meetings in Havana and Washington to address the issue of Cuban migration. It’s also worth noting that transit governments like Mexico have been under pressure to address this situation. Therefore, a far-reaching responsibility can be ascribed to the island government, which, in the knowledge of the future implementation, continued to promote exit via Nicaragua.
However, In terms of narrative and political discourse, the Cuban government will continue to blame the “blockade” as the main cause of Cuba’s economic and social catastrophe. The embargo will be the main argument, this time under the excuse that it prevents the reunification of Cubans. Nostalgic tourism and family reunification are used as arguments on the pretext of insufficient volumes, frequencies and processes. But it is worth noting that Cuba, for example, does not allow Cubans who are naturalized elsewhere to travel with their new citizenship. Which is directly clear evidence of the formal usefulness of migrants and their subordination to Cuban legislation.
The other argument will continue to be the amount of remittances that can be sent to the island, the forms and use of banks and international transfer networks for the flow of capital between migrants and the island. They will continue to blame the “blockade” for this. the problems of access to the international market and the “reluctance” of the US government to trade with the island, which, as is well known, only occurs in official discourse, because the real responsibility for the Cuban situation lies with its own government.
In the event of a new social outburst in Cuba, what future does the regime’s decades-old variable of “steaming the kettle” have? How will Havana deal with its repressive strategy of forced expatriation from now on?
This type of solution is known as an escape valve. It is a concept commonly used in migration studies, particularly in the context of authoritarian origins. In the Cuban case, this valve worked efficiently and allowed the treatment site to be changed.
This means, During the pandemic, the situation just exploded because Cubans had nowhere to go and all borders were closed. So the 9/11 demonstrations happened largely because the Cubans had nowhere to go. It is not for nothing that the free visa for Nicaragua was opened in November 2021. The negotiations were a success for the governments involved. It is worth mentioning, for example, that the Cuban Foreign Minister, Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla, threatened such a withdrawal when he intervened after 9/11, which he later followed through on. Of all the valves, this was undoubtedly the largest, not only because of the quantity, but also because of the time in which it was made and its shape.
The answer to the question is that a new social outbreak is unlikely to happen in the short term. Not because there aren’t enough causes, but because of the strength of these manifestations. In this massive outflow, it was mainly young people who left. What one finds in Cuba today, therefore, is mainly an aging population that does not have the strength to organize and encourage a new social outburst of this magnitude.
Legislation further repressing any act contrary to the Cuban government has also been expanded. The Penal Code is the perfect example. Nevertheless, The Cuban government no longer has the same strength or the same level of conscription. This is evident in the reactions and digital participation of Cubans. Today, Cubans do not express themselves freely in public, but they do so through social networks. The government knows.
Moreover, the current leaders have fallen into a sphere of popular disrepute, retaining their power only thanks to control of the repressive apparatus and perks for their military. There may not be a massive 9/11 outbreak, but dissatisfaction with island politics will no doubt gradually persist.
Next, expatriation policy will continue to be very selective and silent. In other words, Havana does not like its human rights abuses to be exposed to international opinion. Therefore, these expatriations will not be massive, because it is not convenient for them in terms of numbers either.
It would be important for Cubans to know that this type of action is a practice that violates all rights. It is possible that the practices of exiling opponents will continue, however What must not happen is that we Cubans forget those who, despite being unjustly detained, do not want to leave the country. Today they are the main opponents of Havana’s repressive policies.