The government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) begins its term in very different political conditions than in 2003, when the PT first climbed the ramp of the Planalto Palace. At that time only 15 years had passed since the Constituent Assembly and the National Congress was still crawling in the exercise of its callings.
Two decades later, one can say that the executive has remained the same, but that the legislature has reached adulthood: it has its own resources, wants independence and does not give up its role in formulating public policy.
Although this is a scenario often attributed to the recent years of the Jair Bolsonaro (PL) government, in reality it is the result of various attempts to resolve the fact that we live in a presidential system governed by a parliamentary charter.
It is no coincidence that the two impeachment trials opened by the Chamber of Deputies and judged by the Federal Senate took place amidst instabilities caused by the political isolation of Fernando Collor (PTBAL) and Dilma Rousseff (PT), as if such trials are a symptom for the application of the checksandbalance rule would be: Those who want to assert power ultimately do not exercise it.
agenda control
“I don’t know if there was any measure submitted by the Executive that was approved with no changes. If there was one, it will be an exception,” thenPresident Fernando Henrique Cardoso told TV Senado in the distant 1998, while commenting on the weight of the National Congress in drafting the legislation.
Three years later, in 2001, Congress began its journey to scrutiny of the agenda one of the key milestones in strengthening the legislature. With Constitutional Amendment No. 32, the processing of MPs (interim measures) interrupted their main changes: they could no longer be reissued indefinitely. Ironically, by the time he made the statement to TV Senado, the FHC government had passed 2,238 reruns of MPs, leading jurist Celso Antônio Bandeira de Mello to describe Brazil as “the only country governed by equal and consecutive rates.” will”. .
Then, in 2009 under the presidency of Michel Temer in the Chamber and in 2012, following a decision by the STF (Federal Court of Justice), the Executive lost even more leverage over the Congressional agenda. It led to what we see today, where MPs have to go through special commissions. As a result, they hardly set the agenda and often lose effectiveness.
The size of the agenda’s control could be observed in late 2022 with the approval of the ceilingpiercing PEC. Without the tools of coalition presidentialism which he relied on during his first two terms in office Lula struggled to negotiate the proposal, which eventually became dehydrated and processed under the control and leadership of the chamber’s current President, Arthur Lira (PPAL) . ).
Once again Congress has shown that without the center parties today with 256 MPs in the chamber there is no agenda that can succeed, even with the judiciary interfering in the affairs of the legislature.
budget control
So far, the new Lula administration is signaling that it is looking in the rearview mirror while Congress has already switched gears which is what one can infer from the President of the Republic’s statements during the presidential campaign and the alliance of the STF to throw out the rapporteur’s amendments.
“Him [Lira] already want to create semipresidentialism. He already wants to remove power from the President so that power stays in the Chamber of Deputies and he acts as if he were the Emperor of Japan,” Lula said in a statement widely shared by the media.
Lula’s resistance is understandable. When he ruled between 2003 and 2011, parliamentary amendments were not compulsory and the rapporteur’s amendments had not even been drafted. While he was no longer President, Congress saw important changes with the presidency of Eduardo Cunha (PTBSP) in the Chamber and Temer’s 2 years as Chief Executive.
It was a time when Congressmen intensified their search for protagonists in carrying out the agenda which would be consolidated by 2026, when this framework of empowerment could peak. Because with the party reform, about 8 parties tend to have the ability to unite between the centre, left and right.
What will the agenda be?
Given this scenario, the country’s agenda of priorities for 20232026 is packed with novelty. How will the Planalto negotiations and individual debate with each congressman go? Will the base formed earlier this year remain loyal to the President of the Republic, or will it change with each vote?
With the growth of the centerright and the decline of the left, the new government should find it difficult to advance its campaign agenda such as possible backlash on labor reform and disruption of the privatization program, even if it manages to win over parties like PP, União Brasil, Win MDB and PSD for the Esplanada dos Ministérios.
Thus, Lula’s move to the center is inevitable in the years to come, and raises doubts about what the implications of this process will be within his own base, which today has just over 100 MPs.
Social pressure will increase on the part of the parties to look for clear agendas and doctrines. With party membership declining and an electorate increasingly based on values and not necessarily interests parties will need to reinvent themselves if they are to be competitive in 2024 and 2026.
Parties such as the PL and Republicans have already begun to take up this challenge. Valdemar Costa Neto’s (PL) party chose the right path, with a strong focus on reducing the state and discussing harmony between powers. Republicans, on the other hand, mobilized strong opposition in plenary to the ceilingbreaking PEC, which gives clues to their bank’s economic position.
Therefore, tax reform, which has been prioritized by Finance Minister Fernando Haddad (PT), will be a major test of how this unprecedented scenario will affect power dynamics in Brasília. Likewise, the debate on changing the spending ceiling should have a strong role on the part of Congress, as its creation has been one of Congress’ major achievements in recent years.
new concepts
The next legislature will be instrumental in defining new political concepts in Brazil. The conflict between a government that values presidentialism and the informal practice of semipresidentialism should create relevant institutional conflicts.
As the executive and judiciary tend to unite in this process, it is inevitable that the debate about the relationship between the institutions will mature. Questions related to possible changes in the justice system should be on the parties’ radar.
Interference by the STF, whether in reviewing or suspending laws approved by Congress, as in the case of rapporteur changes, in the large number of monocratic decisions, or even in interfering in executive acts as we saw during the Bolsonaro administration must be a central point of this discussion that starts this year.
Therefore, we are entering the year 2023 in a time of changes in the Brazilian political system. A new government comes in with outdated policies that could be weakened if they don’t understand the inevitable transitional scenario we are witnessing.