The Russian operation in Ukraine has a new commander in chief, General Gerasimov. He is a “heavyweight” and a veteran of the Russian military apparatus: the 67-year-old army general has been both first deputy defense minister and chief of the armed forces (CEMA) since 2012, and in this dual capacity he is a member of the National Defense Council.
The West knows him because he is (wrongly) credited with being the father of a “doctrine” that bears his name and theorizes hybrid warfare. He notably appears on lists of individual sanctions adopted by the EU in 2014 and then in 2022 for his contribution to actions against Ukraine.
What significance does this new appointment have not only for the war itself, but also for Russia’s strategic stance?
Technical appointment, political gesture or strategic impact?
Valéri Guerassimov, who retains his post as CEMA, replaces General Surovikin, who was appointed to the post on October 8 as commander of Russian forces in Ukraine. However, the latter was not dismissed: he was merely demoted to Guerassimov’s assistant.
This move raises many questions because of its pace, the status of Russia’s new “warlord” and the strategic deal. Is this a technical appointment of a military operations specialist or a strong political gesture intended for international opinion? Is it simply a sanction against General Surovikin after the defeat at Kherson and the death of dozens (even hundreds) of Russian soldiers at Makiivka on January 1?
In general, should we foresee a shift in Russian strategic stance? Is the Supreme Commander’s waltz over and does this appointment herald a further hardening?
A military “heavyweight”… and political
Gerasimov followed a typical path for professional military personnel of the generation born in the 1950s: starting their careers in the 1970s at the height of the Soviet Union, they rose to higher officer ranks after the end of the USSR in 1991. Guerassimov, like Vladimir Putin, who was three years his senior, thus knew the drunkenness of military hegemony and the bitterness of his country’s strategic overthrow.
Trained as a tank driver, he is very sensitive to the territorial dimension of the Russian campaign in Ukraine: on a technical level, his appointment should make it possible to respond to the difficulties encountered by Russian armored divisions. At the forefront of the offensive in the winter and spring of 2022, Russian armored units suffered numerous setbacks, both in terms of equipment and tactics. Their (even old) competence in this matter undoubtedly heralds a change in the use of armored vehicles in Ukraine – and with it new territorial advances.
First of all, Gerasimov is an experienced officer who is well acquainted with the workings of the army at the tactical, operational (at the level of operations) and strategic levels. His main tactical experience comes from the second Chechen war (1999-2000), an inflexible and very deadly campaign.
He is a veteran of the task forces, staff apparatchik and familiar with political decision-making circles.
Later, as CEMA, he oversaw the preparation, deployment and conduct of the Russian campaign in Syria from the summer of 2015. In short, unlike General Surovikin, he has a very wide range of military experience, from the field to the field in political circles, from conflicts on national soil to far-flung foreign operations. This career, combined with his longevity as CEMA and the trust Putin has in him, gives him a prestige within the army unmatched even by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.
So it is a veteran of the task forces, an apparatchik of the staffs and familiar with the political decision-making circles, who is now directing the war in Ukraine. This decision seems to confirm that a new large-scale Russian offensive is planned for the next few weeks.
A new leader for a new offensive?
The new commander-in-chief of the operation must strengthen joint coordination, which is traditionally weak in Russia. For many observers, the poor cooperation between artillery, infantry and air dimension is a key explanation for the setbacks suffered since August 2022, most notably the recapture of Kherson by the Ukrainians in October.
In addition, Gerasimov is well aware of the importance of the continuum between military and civilian tools in conflicts. In a 2013 speech on the Arab revolutions, he called for the use of media, cultural, financial and social resources to prepare for military operations. This led to him being credited with inventing a “hybrid warfare” doctrine.
His appointment could therefore not only respond to lack of coordination between the armies on the ground, but also prepare a multidimensional offensive in 2023, for example in cyberspace, on regional political scenes or even on related territorial arenas such as the South Caucasus, the Black Sea or Moldova.
The national military prestige associated with his status as “Hero of the Russian Federation” should also, according to the Russian leadership, make it possible to regain control of the currently ongoing reservist mobilization. The “Makiivka disaster” on January 1, 2023 pointed to a certain organizational dilettantism and a certain disciplinary negligence of the officers supervising the newly mobilized. The arrival of CEMA at the forefront of the operation should consolidate the chain of command within the military institution to improve internal discipline and potentially expand mobilization, although it is too early to determine whether this appointment prepares for a general mobilization.
In short, at the military level, this appointment gives clear indications of the nature and pace of the new offensive ahead. This will use all components of the Russian armed forces (land, air, sea, cyber, special forces, Wagner group auxiliaries) and will likely be extended to the entire region: the Russians under Guerassimov will undoubtedly show more active in the Black Sea and from the territory of the Belarusian ally.
At the military level, the Russian operation in Ukraine is no longer “special” in the sense that it is not the deployment of an expeditionary force responsible for quickly taking possession of a state thought to be weak. It becomes strategic in the sense that it is multidimensional and planned for the long term.
Zhukov Syndrome or Lebed’s Curse?
What are the advantages and risks of this appointment for the political leadership and for Vladimir Putin in particular?
Frequently changing military commands is an admission of failure. Similarly, the appointment of the CEMA commander of an operation underscores that the pool of military leaders is limited and that the political level is bereft of its “safeguards”. General Surovikin’s demotion confirms Russian setbacks in the overthrow. And by confusing the strategic level (CEMA) with the operational level (that of the head of the military operation), the political level is exposed. In the event of an obvious failure, the media scapegoat is named: CEMA. But his proximity to the defense minister and the president of the federation means his failure would also be more direct than under Surovikin in the country’s leadership.
Guerassimov’s nomination exposes him like never before. His authority is ruined in case of military setbacks. But if he succeeds, he will also be in danger.
Finally, on a purely political level, this appointment underlines the competition between the ruling circles for the support of the Russian president.
The war in Ukraine and its (paltry) results for Russia have exacerbated internal rivalries. The question of Vladimir Putin’s dolphin rests in new, harder, but more open terms. Public communications from the Wagner Group and its leader, Evgueni Prigojine, show the appetites of the man long nicknamed “Putin’s chef” for having started a fast-food chain. Moreover, at the end of December, he did not hesitate to vehemently attack Guerassimov, blaming him for the poor supply of the troops.
Similarly, for several months, former Prime Minister and President Dmitry Medvedev has attempted to rally nationalist movements by proliferating provocative xenophobic statements. Still other players are more discreetly trying to exploit the unfolding conflict to gain Putin’s favor.
As for Guerassimov himself, his nomination exposes him as never before. Of course, in the event of military setbacks, his authority will be ruined. But if successful, CEMA is also in danger. If he tries to gain a political dimension, he could fall victim to the “Lebed curse”. We remember that General Alexandre Lebed tried to use the military prestige he had acquired in Afghanistan (during the USSR period) and in Moldova (after independence) to pursue a political career. He disappeared in a helicopter crash, the causes of which are disputed.
Likewise, President Putin could be confronted with a “Zhukov syndrome” with this appointment. Marshal Joukov established himself as one of the great military victors of World War II in 1944 and 1945. Stalin had initially benefited from Zhukov’s prestige to make the Soviet collapse of 1941 against the German army forgotten. But then he did everything he could to marginalize this very popular Marshal before launching new purges in the army.
In short, the appointment of General Guerassimov heralds not only a new, more rigorous and continuous offensive at the military level, but also a new strategic stance at the regional level… and possibly a new political situation in Moscow.
Thanks to Laurent Célérier and Florent Parmentier for their contributions to this article.
This article was republished by The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
