The contrast couldn’t be more stark: while Vladimir Putin was examining the models of new sophisticated high-tech weapon systems in Moscow, the Ukrainian armed forces in Crimea staged the worst humiliation for the Russian army. In recent weeks, rocket attacks and acts of sabotage against military installations on the peninsula annexed by Russia in 2014 have multiplied. The attacks on air bases and ammunition depots confirm what we already knew: Ukrainian artillery has the ability to attack in depth, and no Russian (or NATO, for what it’s worth) anti-aircraft systems are able to counter sudden shell fire in the very short term. The sources of fire and the types of effectors used (artillery shells, ballistic missiles, kamikaze drones) are too varied to provide a one-size-fits-all approach to countermeasures.
The incompetence of the Russian armed forces was also recognized by the civilian population, perhaps one of the few times when the veil of censorship and propaganda has been broken by the reality of the facts.
Moscow outlined, spoke about incidents and drew attention to alleged terrorist attacks by Ukrainian Nazis on the legitimate territory of the federation. But the numbers are undeniable: according to Interfax, 38,000 cars crossed the bridge linking the illegally annexed peninsula to mainland Russia on Monday, an all-time record that will remain as impressive as the photos of the columns of smoke against the backdrop of the bathhouses.
The military plan beyond symbols
The symbolic plan is important because it reaffirms Kiev’s intention to continue a relentless struggle in the perimeter of what is internationally recognized as Ukraine, as well as in areas close to the border. This is where the actions of the saboteurs were concentrated, a change from the use of attack helicopters in Belgorod a few months ago. The advantages are many: the Russians have undoubtedly improved anti-aircraft defenses in these sectors, but the use of American artillery would have been a red line for international allies unwilling to provoke a general escalation.
But the military logic behind these attacks is ironclad. As in the first weeks of the conflict, Russia still faces many difficulties in establishing logistical supply routes on the road. The immense losses of trucks and the use of railway lines force the invaders to concentrate their reserves in large reserves deposited near the front line, its depth (i.e. the maneuvering space vulnerable to enemy fire and where defenses can be organized ) is particularly pronounced.
Organizational rigidity and circumstances make it difficult for Russians to adjust to the Ukrainian threat. This is a great advantage for Kyiv, which is trying to weaken the overwhelming Russian superiority in ammunition and artillery with this targeted bombing attack. Indeed, when chaos reigns in the rear, up front it’s the invaders who still have the advantage in terms of firepower. The Russians can afford a continuous bombardment of large parts of the front, the Ukrainians cannot.
Not only the lack of ammunition is the problem, but also the insufficient number of weapons and the variety of ammunition and weapon systems used. Kiev’s troops even damaged some examples of the Panzerhaubitze 2000, the German Panzerhaubitze donated a few weeks ago that tried to maintain a rate of fire that was too high and thus wear down the supplied units, as well as firing Soviet-made shells unsuitable for the system.
brakes and clutches
Therefore, the only hope of the defenders, knowing they cannot attack the vast stores of Russian ammunition and spare parts, is to create supply shortages at the front lines by disrupting the enemy’s logistics systems.
Moreover, by announcing offensives that never materialized around Kherson and damaging infrastructure in the south of the country, the Ukrainians have shown their ability to apply pressure in different parts of the front and force Moscow to release its units to thin out in the Donbass. More dispersed troops mean weaker attack orders and greater operational friction: Russian and Separatist units, already exhausted by months of war, exhaust their attack boost more quickly and are prone to more disobedience and mutinies.
Then why did the Ukrainians stop a real ground offensive to exploit the weakness of the Russian lines? An attack would be a very high stakes bet. The cost of failure would be very high for a country where ammunition and labor are limited resources.
In addition, Ukrainians suffer from a lack of organization in managing multidomain and combined arms operations, i.e. . These skills are essential to advance after an initial breakthrough and take advantage of local advantages. For this reason, the decision to date has been to wear down the structures that support front-line operations; It remains to be seen when the Ukrainians will feel capable of more widespread attacks than simple front-line attacks.