What does Vladimir Putin want and how far is he willing to go? That’s the question everyone was asking at the start of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. After a year of war, we better understand the intentions and ambitions of the Russian dictator, who appears less like a madman ready for nuclear escalation and more like a madman, a rational but dangerous dictator.
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1) He’s not on a suicide mission
If we look at the decisions of the Russian army on the ground, everything indicates that Putin is touching reality.
“He’s not on a suicide mission,” summarizes Maria Popova, a professor of political science at McGill University.
“On the ground, whenever it became impossible to advance, Putin did the sensible thing and withdrew his troops,” she illustrates.
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The fears of a nuclear escalation, which were still very great in February 2022, have “reduced significantly” since then.
“Since then, he has waved the nuclear threat several times, but he has not shown his concrete intention to use it on the ground, beyond words,” notes Ms. Popova.
2) He is not irrational
The decision to invade Ukraine may seem like madness to us, but we now know that it was mostly a misjudgment.
“Putin really thought that Kiev would change in three days. It’s even documented, as soldiers left documents behind,” says Dominique Harel, a professor at the University of Ottawa and Chair of Ukrainian Studies.
Actually, Putin had expected to be able to relive the scenario of 2014, when Crimea was annexed. At that time, very few shots were fired. Donbass was taken in a few days, Mr. Harel recalls.
Moreover, “Putin expected a lukewarm response from the West. He misjudged the different balances of power,” explains Renéo Lukic, professor at the Graduate School of International Relations at Laval University.
There is also a suspicion that Putin is sometimes misinformed by the “hyper-hierarchical” structure he governs, Mr Harel says. “Subordinates always have a vested interest in saying what the boss wants to hear.”
3) A mediocre spy
Before becoming a politician, Putin was an agent of the KGB, the USSR’s secret service. In his book The Gear, Sergei Jirnov tries to get into Putin’s mind specifically through the meetings he had with him when he was himself a KGB agent.
Jirnov describes Putin as a “mediocre” spy, impulsive rather than calculating and willing to sacrifice his people. He says that Putin failed during his brief stint in the KGB’s field services. “Unable to work, unable to assess the extent of the real danger.” That was the conclusion his trainers at the Adropov Institute came to, reports the author, who is now living in exile in France, in his book published last summer.
4) He really believes that Ukrainians are Russians
“What is much clearer and in a rather sinister way is that he is absolutely convinced that Ukraine is an artificial creation,” explains Dominique Harel.
And this worldview is neither new nor unique to Putin. It is actually shared by many Russians.
“But his speech is more sullen, more conspiratorial [qu’avant]remarks Mr. Harel.
“It says here that the Russians are being brainwashed by the propaganda of the regime. Over there, they say that Ukrainians are resisting because they are being brainwashed by American propaganda,” says Maria Popova.
We are therefore a long way from Putin acknowledging the existence of Ukrainian identity or admitting that his invasion did in fact… shake up Ukrainian sentiment.
5) His imperialist rhetoric should be taken seriously
“It’s very clear what Putin wants: to completely control Ukraine,” Maria Popova said. He will not settle for one part of Ukraine.”
Or at least he would like Ukraine not to become a European-style rule of law, but to return to his sphere of influence, specifies René Lukic. All of this is based on an imperialist and nostalgic vision of Russia before 1989. And this vision does not stop at Ukraine’s borders.
Could he try to invade other countries? Experts agree that this seems unlikely in the short term.
What limits them is only their military capabilities and the reality on the ground. “But what if he has that ability later, in 2025? In 2026?” wonders Ms. Popova, who believes that the threat to Europe’s security has increased in a year, especially for non-NATO countries.
“What worries us is the precedent. We now know he’s ready to go that far. The taboo of aggressive war has fallen,” says Dominique Harel.
6) The threat is their modus operandi
Putin uses a form of negotiation that could be summed up as “escalate to de-escalate”. That means demanding big things in order to get smaller ones, and any willingness to compromise is seen as a sign of weakness, explains Maria Popova.
On Russian television, for example, we are now talking about such crazy scenarios as the dissolution of Germany. In the face of such an unrealistic threat, we hope that the enemy will say: “Well, it’s not so bad if we cede a small country like Moldova to Russia,” explains Ms. Popova.
All these reasons mean for Dominique Harel that we can neither negotiate with Putin nor let him win against Ukraine.
7) The next few months will be crucial
Renéo Lukic estimates that six months is how long it would take the Ukrainian army to receive and appropriate the new tanks and weapons promised by the West.
“So the next six months will be crucial,” he says.
“Russia’s advantage is its number of soldiers. Ukraine’s advantage would be military and technological,” summarizes Mr. Lukic.
No one has a crystal ball, but Dominique Harel believes a counteroffensive is possible that would allow Ukraine to regain lost ground in 2022.
The other scenarios, namely a “deadlocked war” if the status quo persists or a Russian counter-offensive would both be “terrible” for the Ukrainians.
